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Abstract
In 2007 Slovenia launched a comprehensive reform of its tax system. To estimate the 
different proposals (including a flat-tax proposal) and their overall effect on individual 
taxpayers and government budget a static micro-simulation model was constructed and 
combined with a computable general equilibrium model. It uses a large, comprehensive 
database (6% of the population) provided by relevant ministries and government agen-
cies and proved to be a reliable tool during implementation of the reform. In the paper, 
the main characteristics of both models are presented along with the results of different 
reform scenarios, including those which finally passed the parliament and now form part 
of the Slovenian tax system.
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1 Introduction
A significant part of the Slovenian current tax system, including the new personal 
income tax (PIT) and new corporate income tax (CIT), was formed at the start of 1990. 
During the 1990s few changes were introduced to both taxes, while in 2004 new PIT and 
CIT laws were passed by parliament, coming into effect in January 2005.1 However, fres-
hly accepted tax codes were already changed by amendments in 2005. In addition, during 
2006 completely new PIT and CIT tax codes were prepared, which have been effective 
since January 2007. For the purposes of this last tax reform two simulation models were 
constructed: (1) a microsimulation model; and (2) a macroeconomic recursive dynamic 
general equilibrium model. Both models were used to estimate the effect of different tax 
combinations on the income position of individual taxpayers, households, as well as on 
the long-term macroeconomic position of the economy.
At the same time, a wide public discussion was going on regarding tax reform in Slo-
venia. The basis was the claim that the Slovenian tax system produces relatively high taxa-
tion of labour and an intransparent and complicated set of tax codes, which are difficult to 
implement. The fact is that wages in Slovenia are not only taxed with a 38.2% rate of soci-
al security contribution but also with a payroll tax2 (with progressive marginal tax rates of 
between 0% and 14.8%). This combination of PIT, social security contribution and payroll 
tax effectively classifies Slovenia among those countries with the highest taxes on labo-
ur in the EU. In 2004, total taxes on labour in the EU25 represented on average 18.5% of 
GDP (15.9% in EU-10 - new EU member states), while in Slovenia the share amounted 
to 21.6%. The implicit tax rate on employed labour in Slovenia (37.8%) also exceeded the 
EU25 average of 35.9% (34.7% in the EU-10; EU Commission, 2006).
The discussion on tax reform in Slovenia mostly focused on the example of Slovakia, 
which introduced a flat-tax system for PIT in 2004 with a single tax rate of 19%. In ad-
dition, Slovakia employed the same (19%) and only one rate for value-added tax (VAT) 
and the same 19% rate for corporate income tax too (IBFD, 2006). The idea of a tax sy-
stem similar to the Slovakian, which was even included among official government re-
form proposals (Odbor za reforme, 2005), triggered a sharp response from labour unions 
in Slovenia, mainly due to the fear of a replacement of the existing double VAT rate sy-
stem (with a reduced 8.5% and standard 20% rate) with a single VAT rate.
The purpose of this paper is to explain why the income tax reform passed in 2006 was 
chosen by the Slovenian Parliament. That is, the results of micro and macro simulations, 
whereby different combinations of taxes were considered (see below), suggested that op-
tions other than the Slovakia-like tax system are not inferior with respect to the country’s 
long-term economic development. The final combination of changed taxes, which consti-
tutes the 2007 tax reform, thus includes a reduction of the highest marginal tax rate of PIT 
(from 50% to 41%), a schedular 20% taxation of interest, dividends and capital gains, a 
1 This PIT code differed from the system which was valid during the 1990s by its higher allowances for chil-
dren, its broader tax base and it was based on the worldwide income concept, while the CIT code has introduced sev-
eral new elements regarding the international aspects of the environment which Slovenia encountered with its EU 
membership in 2004.
2 Payroll tax was a relatively important government revenue – it represented EUR 472.3 million in 2004 (1.9% 
of GDP or 4.4% of general government revenue (Ministry of Finance, 2007)).31
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reduction of the statutory CIT rate from 25% to 20% and the abolition of payroll tax. The 
2007 tax reform thus represents a gradual step and once again Slovenia did not follow se-
veral other Eastern European countries that decided on more radical approaches.3
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 outlines the data and methodology, 
Section 3 describes the tax scenarios that were taken into account, the results are presen-
ted in Section 4, while the final section offers some concluding remarks.
2 Data and methodology
2.1 The microsimulation model
For the purposes of the reform simulations the existing versions of the microsimu-
lation model (Čok 2002; Čok, Stropnik and Stanovnik, 2004) were updated with a new 
database created specifically for the purposes of the 2007 tax reform. The database con-
tains a sample of 111,705 individuals from 38,513 households. It is a merged database 
based on separate files from the Ministry of Finance (containing PIT records), the Mi-
nistry of Labour, Family and Social Affairs (containing records on social benefits), the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs (containing data on socio-economic characteristics). Since it 
is based on administrative data (not survey data) it is of high quality and enables the si-
mulation of practically all direct taxes and benefits at individual and household levels. It 
originates from 2004 and all the results are thus stated in 2004 prices. The model is sta-
tic in time; it does not include changes in behaviour or consequential macroeconomic se-
cond-order effects.4
In the first step of the microsimulation, databases from different sources were prepa-
red in the final form (final database), which enables simulations. Secondly, the PIT system 
from 2004 is replicated. Since the original data also include PIT calculated by the Mini-
stry of Finance it is straightforward to compare the PIT calculated by the model with the 
recorded PIT for each individual taxpayer (the ‘micro’ validation of the model). While 
the database includes all relevant tax parameters for individual taxpayers (all sources of 
income subject to tax and tax allowances) it is no surprise that the PIT calculated by the 
model completely coincides with the recorded PIT. At this stage a ‘macro’ validation of 
the model and its database is also considered, taking into account that the sample repre-
sents 6% of the Slovenian population. In fact, the difference between the actual and esti-
mated PIT is minor: the actual aggregate amount of PIT in 2004 was 0.5% higher com-
pared with our simulation (1,596 million euros (Ministry of Finance, 2007) vs. the simu-
lated 1.588 million euros).
In the next step, the parameters of the PIT system from 2006 (PIT-2006) were built 
into the system to establish the year 2006 as the benchmark for the proposed tax changes. 
3 For example, Croatia, which (temporarily) introduced a ‘consumption-based tax’ PIT (Blažić, 1999); many 
Central and Eastern European countries (for example, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Romania, Russia, Ukraine) 
opted for a ‘flat-tax’ concept of PIT (IBFD, 2006).
4 However, most microsimulation models are also static (Redmond, Sutherland and Wilson, 1998). In the case of 
Slovenia, the short time series of data and relative stability of the tax-benefit system in the last 15 years would hardly 
even provide enough information to estimate taxpayers’ responses to the tax-benefits changes.32
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Finally, the parameters of the proposed tax changes – different scenarios – were built into 
the model and the results were compared with the PIT-2006. Selected results from the 
microsimulation, more precisely the net household income under different PIT scenarios, 
also provide an input for the macroeconomic recursive dynamic model.
2.2 The recursive dynamic computable general equilibrium model
The macroeconomic modelling platform of the Slovenian economy is represented 
by a dynamic multi-sectoral and multi-household computable general equilibrium model 
(CGE), based on a social accounting matrix (SAM) for the year 2004 (Bayar et al., 2006). 
The model incorporates the economic behaviour of households, firms, government and 
the foreign sector. All economic agents are assumed to adopt an optimizing behaviour 
under relevant budget constraints and all markets operate under the perfect competition 
assumption. The model embodies considerable details on the nature of production and de-
mand in the economy and can thus be used to analyse a vast range of issues; either broad 
in scope or household- and industry-specific.
Five household quintiles with respect to income are distinguished in the model. Each 
quintile receives a share of capital income, labour income, mixed income5, and transfers 
from the government, the firms and the EU. Taxable income is further derived for each 
quintile by taking into account the share of income that is subject to PIT. The optimal 
allocation between the consumption commodities is given by optimizing a Stone-Geary 
utility function in the context of a linear expenditure system (LES), which represents a 
set of consumer demand equations linear in total expenditure (Geary, 1950; Stone, 1954). 
To evaluate the overall change in consumer welfare by quintile we use the equivalent va-
riation6 in income, which is based on the concept of a money metric indirect utility fun-
ction (Varian, 1992).
The model distinguishes twenty perfectly competitive production sectors consisting 
of both public and private enterprises. There are twenty types of commodities, of which 
each sector produces one or several types. Gross output for each sector is determined from 
a nested production structure. Producers are assumed to choose intermediate inputs and the 
mixed factor7 bundle according to a Leontief production function, and the optimal level 
of labour, capital and mixed factor is chosen according to a constant elasticity of substi-
tution (CES) function. Labour is differentiated according to the level of education in three 
skill groups; unskilled labour, skilled labour and highly skilled labour.8
The specification of foreign trade is based on the small open economy assumption, 
i.e. with no influence on world market prices. Three main groups of trading partners are 
distinguished in the model; the EU15, the EU9 (new EU member states) and the rest of 
5 The mixed income corresponds to remuneration for work carried out by the owner or members of his family 
which cannot be distinguished from his profits as entrepreneur.
6 Equivalent variation measures the income needed to make the household as well off as in the new counterfac-
tual equilibrium evaluated at benchmark prices. The equivalent variation is positive for welfare gains from the policy 
scenario and negative for losses (Harrison and Kriström, 1999).
7 The mixed factor is a composite of labour and capital of unincorporated enterprises.
8 Wage differentials of the wage curve are derived as the ratio between the wage rate by sector and skill and the 
average wage rate by skill level (Derviş, de Melo and Robinson, 1982).33
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the world. The Armington (1969) assumption of limited substitution possibilities between 
domestically produced and imported goods is adopted in the model.
Due to the complexity of the model, a combination of consistent closure rules is nee-
ded. In order to achieve the clearing of the labour markets, inter-sectoral mobility of la-
bour is assumed for each skill group. On the capital market the sectoral capital stock is 
exogenously fixed, thus introducing rigidities. The investment is assumed to adjust to 
the available domestic and foreign savings. Government total expenditures are fixed as a 
share of GDP, whereas government deficit adjusts. The exchange rate is fixed, while the 
deficit of the current account adjusts.
The model has a recursive dynamic structure composed of a sequence of several tem-
porary equilibria. The first equilibrium in the sequence is given by the benchmark year. 
In each time period, the model is solved for an equilibrium given the exogenous condi-
tions assumed for that particular period. The equilibria are connected to each other thro-
ugh capital accumulation. Thus, the endogenous determination of investment behaviour 
is essential for the dynamic part of the model. Investment and capital accumulation in a 
given year depend on expected rates of return for the subsequent year, which are deter-
mined by actual returns on capital in the current year. The expected rate of return requi-
red to maintain indefinitely the current rate of capital growth was specified as an inverse 
logistic function of the proportionate growth in capital stock (Dixon and Rimmer, 2002). 
The model was built within the general algebraic modelling system (GAMS, 2006) and 
solved with an appropriate algorithm in annual steps.
3 Tax scenarios
Five different tax scenarios were calculated and compared with the baseline scena-
rio, i.e. tax system valid through 2006 (TAXES-2006). The main characteristics of the 
tax combinations which were simulated are presented in Table 1. In the last column, there 
are the actually accepted tax solutions (TAXES-2007) which were passed by the Slove-
nian Parliament in 2006 and have been effective since January 2007. Since the microsi-
mulation and CGE models use data from 2004, the tax parameters are expressed in euros 
in 2004 prices.
Two of the scenarios (SC1 and SC2) represent the ‘flat-tax’ PIT system9 since they 
employ a single marginal tax rate of 22% and 25%, while others retain tax schedules with 
two or more tax brackets. However, all of them include schedular 20% taxation of inte-
rest, capital gains and dividends. The scenarios also differ regarding the number of tax 
allowances and the actually accepted solution includes the same tax allowances as the 
2006 system, with slightly modified values. Regarding CIT, the scenarios differ from the 
2006 system in terms of the size of the statutory tax rate and tax allowances. The actu-
ally accepted solution thus reduces the statutory rate from 25% to 20%, besides reducing 
the tax allowances.
9 It should be emphasised that the term flat-tax only refers to PIT and has no similarities with the broader concept 
of Hall and Rabushka (Hall and Rabushka, 1995), which is an expenditure tax connecting PIT and CIT.34
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The assumptions regarding other elements do not change from one scenario to anot-
her; the rates of VAT remain constant at the existing 8.5% and 20%, while the rate of so-
cial security contributions remains at the 2006 level of 38.2%, the share of total gover-
nment expenditures in GDP was assumed to be reduced by 2% by 2008 and by an addi-
tional 2% by 2012. Expenditures on research and development (R&D) and tertiary edu-
cation were assumed to increase according to the EU Lisbon Strategy. The simulations 
were based on the assumption that transfers to households keep their existing growth (for 
pensions, maternity and sickness leave) or with the consumer price index (CPI) for other 
transfers (scholarship, housing subsidies, social assistance etc.).
Transfers between the Slovenian budget and the EU budget are taken into account 
using data from the general government consolidated accounts prepared by the Ministry 
of Finance. Finally, it was also assumed that government investments and subsidies re-
main constant at the level of the base year, 2004, while government final consumption is 




The main results of macroeconomic simulations are presented in Table 2, which in-
cludes comparisons of simulations with the baseline scenario (TAXES-2006). The latest 
is based on assumptions that there are no changes in the tax system from 2006, while the 
economy (all real variables and nominal incomes) grows at a steady rate of 4%. The para-
meters of other simulations (SC1-SC5) are already presented in Table 2, including the sce-
nario TAXES-2007, which contains the parameters of the actually accepted tax reform.
The results shown in Table 2 reveal that the different scenarios do not differ from 
each other very much regarding the impact on the macroeconomic aggregates. However, 
from the individual taxpayer’s point of view, the accepted PIT-2007, which is part of sce-
nario TAXES-2007 changes the income position of practically all households and indi-
vidual taxpayers, as presented in Section 4.2, which focuses on the micro consequences 
of the examined PIT systems. 
It is interesting to add that according to our simulations there will be a considera-
ble decrease in the unemployment rate (see Table 2). This is due to significant job crea-
tion caused by strong expansion of the private sector (cf. Bayar et al., 2006). The unem-
ployment rate among unskilled workers would thus more than halve, declining from 19.8% 
in 2004 to 8.4% in 2025. Among skilled and highly skilled workers, the decline in the 
unemployment rate would be even more impressive; among skilled workers the unem-
ployment rate would fall from almost 10% in 2004 to 4.6% in 2013 and to 2.3% in 2025, 
and among highly skilled workers it would be almost completely eliminated (decrease 
from 3% in 2004 to only 0.3% in 2025).35
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4.2 Microsimulations
In this section, static consequences of the different PIT scenarios are estimated at the 
household and individual levels10. The three different measures – Gini coefficient, squa-
red coefficient of variation and the Atkinson index11 – presented in Table 3 reveal that the 
overall inequality under all scenarios grew in comparison with the PIT-2006 system.12
Table 3   Income inequality measures, based on household equivalent disposable income, 
household level
Inequality measure PIT-2006 PIT-SC1 PIT-SC2 PIT-SC3 PIT-SC4 PIT-SC5 PIT-2007
Gini 0.2730 0.2895 0.2896 0.2851 0.2876 0.2839 0.2785
Index (PIT-2006=100) 106.0 106.1 104.4 105.3 104.0 102.0
Atkinson(ε = 2) 0.2523 0.2686 0.2686 0.2650 0.2689 0.2652 0.2594
Index (PIT-2006=100) 106.5 106.5 105.0 106.6 105.1 102.8
I2 0.3024 0.3849 0.3852 0.3664 0.3688 0.3426 0.3210
Index (PIT-2006=100) 127.3 127.4 121.2 122.0 113.3 106.2
Source: own calculations, microsimulation model.
10 The Ministry of Finance (2006) also estimated the consequences of the PIT reform, mostly at the level of indi-
vidual taxpayers. In this paper a broader approach is chosen, also taking into account selected socio-economic ele-
ments and the household level.
11 All three measures are calculated according to Cowel (1977).
12 The dynamics of wage and income inequality as well as subjective economic well-being in Slovenia in the 
period after independence is analysed in Stanovnik and Verbič (2005) and Verbič and Stanovnik (2006).
Table 2 Results of the macroeconomic simulations
Macroeconomic aggregates – 
average 2007-25 (in %)
TAXES
2006
SC1 SC2 SC3 SC4 SC5
TAXES
2007
Growth rate of real GDP 4.00 5.06 5.06 5.05 5.05 5.06 5.06
Index (BASE=100) 126.5 126.5 126.3 126.3 126.5 126.5
Growth rate of private consumption 4.00 5.04 5.04 5.02 5.03 5.04 5.04
Index (BASE=100) 126.0 126.0 125.5 125.8 126.0 126.0
Growth rate of government 
consumption
4.00 4.15 4.15 4.18 4.17 4.14 4.14
Index (BASE=100) 103.8 103.8 104.5 104.3 103.5 103.5
Growth rate of investment 4.00 5.25 5.25 5.3 5.28 5.23 5.23
Index (BASE=100) 131.3 131.3 132.5 132.0 130.8 130.8
Growth rate of exports 4.00 5.36 5.36 5.32 5.34 5.38 5.38
Index (BASE=100) 134.0 134.0 133.0 133.5 134.5 134.5
Growth rate of imports 4.00 5.14 5.14 5.14 5.14 5.14 5.14
Index (BASE=100) 128.5 128.5 128.5 128.5 128.5 128.5
Unemployment rate in 2025 (in %) 10.71 3.29 3.35 3.44 3.42 3.33 3.33
Index (BASE=100) 30.7 31.3 32.1 31.9 31.1 31.1
Source: own calculations, CGE model.38
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1 101.4 101.5 101.8 114.8
2 104.9 104.7 108.8 120.6
3 103.6 103.4 109.5 123.0
4 94.0 93.8 104.6 98.9
5 71.9 71.9 92.5 72.2
All 81.5 81.7 102.9 79.1
PIT-SC2
1 72.3 72.5 70.6 84.5
2 83.2 83.3 81.0 87.9
3 90.9 91.0 91.3 99.2
4 89.9 89.8 94.0 92.9
5 76.0 76.0 88.9 77.4
All 80.4 80.6 89 80.4
PIT-SC3
1 73.4 72.8 72.3 94.6
2 76.0 75.8 75.1 87.7
3 77.8 77.7 77.8 86.7
4 77.0 77.1 78.0 71.0
5 70.1 70.6 76.1 60.5
All 72.6 72.9 76.7 64.0
PIT-SC4
1 73.4 72.8 72.3 94.6
2 76 75.8 75.1 87.7
3 77.9 77.7 77.8 86.7
4 77.2 77.2 78.0 71.5
5 76.6 76.9 77.7 65.3
All 76.8 77.0 77.2 67.9
PIT-SC5
1 88.4 87.9 88.2 107.3
2 88.4 88.3 89 101.1
3 87.3 87.2 88.9 94.5
4 85.1 84.9 85.8 88.3
5 89.0 88.9 85.6 90.3
All 88.0 87.9 87.1 90.8
PIT-2007
1 88.3 87.9 88.1 93.0
2 88.3 88.1 89.0 100.5
3 87.0 86.9 88.8 93.3
4 84.7 84.6 85.5 86.5
5 90.8 90.8 85.8 90.7
All 89.1 89.0 87.0 90.9
Source: own calculations, microsimulation model.39
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Additional results of the microsimulation at the household level are presented in Table 
4. Individuals are aggregated into five quintile groups regarding household equivalent dis-
posable income13. In the first column they are presented together, the second column in-
cludes individuals who were employed, the third are those employed at less than the ave-
rage wage while the fourth column includes pensioners.
As the results from Table 4 reveal, all the examined scenarios (PIT-SC1 to PIT-2007) 
lead to a substantial drop in government revenues compared with PIT-2006 – the relati-
ve decrease in revenues ranges between 10.9% (PIT-2007) and 27.4% (PIT-SC3). Assu-
ming the same income pattern as in 2004, the government could expect 10.9% less reve-
nue from PIT under the PIT-2007 tax code compared with the PIT-2006 tax code. The 
scenarios also differ regarding the relative taxation of income quintiles. For example, the 
lowest income quintile under PIT-SC1 would pay 1.4% more PIT compared with the PIT-
2006 system. However, the actual reduction of government revenue and relative taxation 
of individuals from different income quintiles would be different due to economic growth, 
the changed pattern of income sources and demographic development that have occurred 
in the period since 2004 and that are not taken into account due to the static nature of the 
microsimulation model.
To obviate the need for a large volume of information, in the rest of this section we 
only compare PIT-2006 and PIT-2007. In Table 5, households are separated regarding 
the number of children, where a child is defined as a person below 18 or 26 years (if she 
is a full-time student).
Table 5   Distribution of the average household’s after-tax income, by number of 







0 41.5 16,840 17,151 101.8
1 28.5 18,984 19,358 102.0
2 25.2 19,873 20,238 101.8
3 4.0 20,776 21,164 101.9
4 0.5 23,584 24,108 102.2
5 or more 0.3 23,747 24,267 102.2
Source: own calculations, microsimulation model.
The results in Table 5 show that the majority of households (41.5%) do not have 
children – pensioner households prevail here. Among the others, most of them have one 
child, while only 0.3% of households from the sample have five or more children. The 
data reveal that no one category of households is worse off (regardless of the number of 
13 Household disposable income is calculated as the sum of net income subject to PIT and income not subject to 
PIT (social transfers). To calculate equivalent disposable income, the OECD’s equivalence scale is used, which gives 
a weight of 1 for the first adult (over 16 years), a weight of 0.7 for the second and subsequent adult and a weight of 
0.5 for any child.40
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children) and thus confirm the overall ‘generosity’ of the PIT reform as regards different 
subsets of taxpayers, which is confirmed by the rest of this section. The results presented 
in Table 6 suggest that the PIT-2007 reform increases after-tax income in all income qu-
intiles (on average), which are better off under PIT-2007 compared with PIT-2006. The 
average after-tax income in the lowest quintile is thus 0.6% higher while in the top quin-
tile it is 2.6% higher.
Table 6   Distribution of average annual after-tax income, by income quintiles, 
individual level (in euros in 2004 prices)
Quintile PIT-2006 PIT-2007  Index  (PIT-2006=100)
1. 4,288 4,313 100.6
2. 6,351 6,378 100.4
3. 8,104 8,258 101.9
4. 10,500 10,803 102.9
5. 18,088 18,557 102.6
Source: own calculations, microsimulation model.
Table 7 shows the distribution of after-tax income using the aggregation of taxpayers 
in five categories regarding their education. The results clearly confirm a correlation 
between the level of education and the level of income. More educated taxpayers report 
a substantially higher income; as the data in Table 7 show, the average annual income 
of a taxpayer with at least university education is 2.5 times higher than the income of a 
taxpayer who has completed primary school or lower education (16,792 euros vs. 6,476 
euros). As for PIT-2007, it improves the income position of all education groups while it 
also provides a bigger income difference for more educated taxpayers.
Table 7   Distribution of average after-tax income, by education, individual level (in 







1. 15.6 6,410 6,476 101.0
2. 23.0 7,247 7,348 101.4
3. 33.2 9,105 9,311 102.3
4. 8.8 12,653 13,001 102.7
5. 12.4 16,375 16,792 102.5
Note: Education is coded in the following manner: 1. primary school or less, 2. lower cycle secon-
dary school, 3. upper cycle secondary school, 4. non-university higher education, 5. university educa-
tion or more
Source: own calculations, microsimulation model.41
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As the above results show, the average changes in annual after-tax income at the tax-
payer level are relatively modest and it is therefore no surprise that income inequality me-
asures also reflect quite minor changes in the distribution of after tax-income. Finally, all 
three measures presented in Table 8 reveal that the overall inequality slightly increases 
between the PIT-2006 and PIT-2007 systems.
Table 8   Income inequality measures, based on individual after-tax income, individual 
level
Inequality measure PIT-2006  PIT-2007  Index (PIT-2006=100)
Gini 0.2906 0.3010 103.6
I2 0.4343 0.4482 103.2
Atkinson (ε = 2) 0.2405 0.2466 102.5
Source: own calculations, microsimulation model.
5 Conclusions
In 2005 and 2006 a broad discussion emerged in Slovenia regarding the country’s tax 
system. It was characterised by claims that the tax system needed simplifications and the 
effective reduction of taxation on labour. Among the different proposals, a flat-tax system 
similar to the Slovakian with a single (and same) tax rate for PIT, CIT and VAT divided 
public opinion and was rejected in particular by labour unions.
However, the final tax reform effective from January 2007 includes new PIT and 
CIT codes, new tax procedure rules, the gradual abolition of payroll tax and several chan-
ges to less important taxes (for example, inheritance tax). To a large extent, the accep-
ted solutions are based on estimations performed by the two simulation models: the mi-
crosimulation model and CGE model, which were constructed for the purposes of the re-
form. Several administrative databases were merged together to form a single data base, 
which contains a sample of 6% of the Slovenian population and represents a comprehen-
sive foundation for the simulations. They resulted in a tax reform which is both politi-
cally acceptable and fiscally sustainable in the long term. Both models have thus proved 
to be useful and indispensable tools for the estimations of tax reform proposals and have 
fully met expectations. 
In comparison with several CE countries, which have implemented quite radical tax 
reforms, Slovenia has once again decided on a gradual approach. As the results in the 
paper show, the consequences of the reform are relatively modest and give benefits to 
practically all taxpayers while they are detrimental to the government budget in the short 
run. However, by introducing several of these changes (reduction of the highest marginal 
PIT rate, reduction of statutory CIT rate and introduction of schedular taxation of capital 
income) Slovenia has merely taken a step closer to the common EU practice.42
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